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(8. F. No. 17343.

In Bank. June S, ]948.]

EDNA GREENli'IELD et al., as Administrators with the
Will Annexed, etc., Plaintiffs, v. A. W. MA'l'HER, Respondent; DOROTHY DEVORE MATHER et aI., Appollants.
[1] Judgments-Res Judicata-Matters Dot in Issue.-A judgment
in an action to invalidate a property settlement betwern
husband and wife and an assignment pursuant thereto of a
one-half interest in a claim against an estate, which, in addition to upholding the settlement and assignment, purp"rted
to award each spouse a half interest in the fund on deposit
as the unpaid balance of the claim, was not res judicllta as to
such matter where there was no issue or evidence in the
nction on the subject and no consideration was given to the
question of payments previously made to the parties, and
where, moreover, in view of inconsistent positions take!'! by
the parties in the prior litigation and the failure to draw
distinctions between the claim and the fund on deposit there
were conflicting appellate eourt decisions leading to the
juub'IUent in question.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco. E. P. Mogan, JuJge.
Reversed.
[1] See 15 Cal.Jur. 135; 30 Am.Jur. 927.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1] Judgmcnts, § 400.
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Act.ion in interpleader by administrators of an estate to
det.ermine right ti, unpaid halan~e due on an allowed claim
ngainst the est.atp. Juol!l1H'nt awarding original claimant onehalf of sum and other half to his former wife as assignee of
half interest in claim, reversed.
Don Lake and James R. Jaffray for Appellants.
Marcel E. Cerf, Robinson & Leland and Henry Robinson
for Respondent.
OAR'l'ER, J.-The appeal here involved is from a judgment
in an action of interpleader commenced by the administrators
of the estate of Louis R. Greenfield in the Superior Court of
the City and County of San Francisco on April 12, 1935. At
the time this action was commenced said administrators
deposited with the clerk of said court the sum of $12,549.60
admittedly due on an allowed claim presented against said
estate by A. W. Mather, respondent herein. The appellant
and respondent herein were named as defendants in said action, and each filed an answer and cross-complaint in the court
below in which they claimed ownership of the sum of money
deposited by said administrators in said court. A former appeal in this action was decided by this court on August 3, 1939
(see Greenjil'ld v. Mather, 14 Ca1.2d 228 193 P.2d 100]).
The record now before us discloses that: On June 16, 1933,
A. W. Mather, cross-defendant and respondent herein, assigned to his then wife, Dorothy Devore Mather, cross-complainant and appellant herein, an undivided one-half interest
in and to a claim against the estate of Greenfield, pending in
the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco,
the principal sum of which was approximately $75,000. At
the date of the assignment there was admittedly unpaid on
said claim the sum of $38,699. After this assignment was
executed and delivered, Mrs. Mather gave notice thereof to the
administrators of the Greenfield estate. Thereafter said administrators paid Mr. Mather the following amounts:
September 5. 1933 ..•.•••••••••••••••.. $ 7,441.00
Jalluary 1, 1934 ..•.••••
$ 5,881.00
1IIm·l·h 2, 1934 ......................... $ 6,327.50
July 24. 1934 ......................... $ 6,919.55
00 0

/

00 0 00 0 • • • • • •

making a total paid to A. W. Mather of ...... $26,569.05 after ,TIl' excc1tfio1l of the assignmcnt. Said administrators also
paid to l\)l's. l\lather tht>sum of $7,44] on Septelllber 5, 1933.
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She has received no other payment on account of her half 'If
said claim. In additioll to the principal of $38.69!) due on said
claim at the timp of the assignment, interest accrued thereon
amounting to the sum of $7,560.65, making a total of principal
and interest of $46,259.65, of which Mr. and Mrs. Mather were
each entitled to one-half or $23,129.82. Mr. Mather has reo
ceived $26,569.05, or $3,439.23 more than his share. Mrs.
Mather has received only $7,44], or $15,688.82 less than her
share. These figures are taken from the record in this case,
and their correctness is not questioned by the respondent.
In fact, counsel for respondent state in their petition for hear·
ing in this court in this case at page 52 thereof: "We have
never examined the probate file, or the vouchers, and made and
make no representations in regard to its contents. " This statement should foreclose counsel for respondent from attacking
the correctness of the above figures as the record discloses
they were taken from said file.
At the trial of this action respondent A. W. Mather offered
in evidence a judgment entered in an action in the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County on March 29, 1945, which action
was commenced by him against appellant in said court on August 3, 1934. This judgment purported to award one-half of the
said sum of $12,549.60 on deposit in the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco to respondent and the
other half to appellant. The trial court admitted the judgment in evidence, held it to be res judicata, refused to admit
any evidence offered by appellant, and rendered judgment
awarding respondent one-half of the above-mentioned sum and
the other half to appellant. This appeal followed.
[1] To understand the background of this litigation a review of the proceedings in the Los Angeles action is necessary.
The Los Angeles action was commenced by Mr. Mather on
August 3, 1934. It pleaded three causes of action. The first
cause of action was for rescission of a property settlement
agreement entered into between himself and Mrs. Mather on
June 16, 1933, upon the ground that it was induced by false
representations and fraud. The second cause of action was
for rescission of the same agreement upon the ground of mistake. The third cause of action was for declaratory relief, by
whi<.·h be Nought to haw the same agreement declared void
- UpUll the gruund of illl·gality because it was entered into between a hushllnrl and wife in the Territory of Hawaii contrary
to the lilwli of that terdtul'Y. The administratora:; of the Green-

)

)
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Geld estate were joined a:-; defl'llUants, and the complaint
prayed for the issuance of an injulwtioll rC'straining thelll
fr~l}l, I.lnking any further. paYlllcUls to 1\11'8. l\1at.her 011 aeeoullt
of her half interest in the claim which ha(1 been assignl'l\ to
her. A restraining order was iSSllt'u <111<1 ser\'l~d on saiu a.dministrators, and they filed an answer in till' nature of a disclaimer in which they admitted that they held the SUIlI of
$12,549.60 unpaid on said claim. 'I'his a.nswer was 110t served
(In Airs. Mather and she filed no plea cling raiging any issue
with respect to the sum mentioned in said answer.
Mrs. Mather interposed a demurrer to the complaint filed
by Mr. Mather which was sustained without leave to aml~nd
as to the third cause of action, and judgment wus entered on
Jauuary 4, 1935, decreeing that plaintiff take nothing by said
third cause of action. The demurrer a.s to the first and sec,md
c:lUSes of action 'vas overruled. The case went to trial on
these e:lUSCS of action on February 18, 1935, and jUdgment
was l'ntcred as to those causes of ac:tion on March 14, 1935,
denying Mr. Mather any relief. Mr. Mather appt'aled irma
the judgment of January 4, 1935, and this appeal was dismissed on the ground that said judgment was not a final judgment. (See Mathe,. v. Mather, 5 Ca1.2d 617 [55 P.2d 1174].)
lIe attempted to appeal from the judgment entered March 14,
1935, on the first and second causes of action, but this appeal
was dismis.'>Cd on S~ptelUber 10, 1935, for failure to file trail"
script. In the opinion of this court in Mather v. Mather, 5 Cal.
2d 617 (55 P.2d 1174], the statelllent is made that: "It is at
once apparlmt that no final judgment was entered in the
action until March 14, 1935."
Mr. Mather had filed an answer and cross-complaint in the
interplcader action in San Francisco in which he raised the
samc issues as to the validity of the property settlement agreement as were raised by his thiril cause of action in the Los
Angeles action. In this cross-complaint he attacked the validity of the assignment to Mrs. Mather of the half interest in
t~IC claim against the Greenfield estate and contended that
~Ilch assignment was invalid and void for the same reason
tJI:1t the property settlement agreement was invalid. Mrs.
~.htllerjoined issue with him by answer and cross-colllplaint
in \'.hich she denied the ~negations of his cross-compluint and
pkaded her right to the ownership of' th!' half interest itl the
ci:lL'll assigned to her.
After the dismissal of tilt' apPl'uls 1'1'0111 til,' two Los ~\Ilgeles
judglllcuts, the San Fl'alJl'isco aetioll came to trial and Mrs,

June 1948)
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Mather's counsel offered in evidence Ii certified copy of the
judgments of January 4th and March ]4, 1935, in the Los
.Angeles action and objected to any evidence being offered by
Mr. Mather in support of the allegatiOl:.8 of his cross-complaint
()n the grouud that the issues raise·! I.y 1h~l' allegatl"ns were
determined in the Los .8.ugeltls action uur1 th'lt thc judgll.llmts
of January 4t.h and March 14, 1t135, were res judicata. 'l'hc
trial court sustain cd tbt' objcctior: ~nd t.hereupon eutered
ju{lgl:lcnt in favor of Mrs. Mat!ler awardiub to her the full
amount of the money deposited by the administrators of the
Grc(:ufield estate in the interpleader aet.ion :18 constituting the
balance of her half of the claim pursuant to the assignment.
On appeal to this court by Mr. Mather, this jnJg~llcnt was
reversed upon the btI'Ound that the Lns Angeles judgments
were not final judgments. (See Greenfield v. Matker, 14 Cal.
2d 2~ti [:.13 P.2.1100].)
Ttc attorneys for Mrs. Mather then wtnf into the Superior
COl:rt. of 1$18 Angeles County and ruo,'ed for a new judgment
in t!:ut action. The motion was hear.} before Judge Clarence
111. Hausoll who adopted thc fiudiubrs ru~t1e by Judge Frank M.
Swit!, 0[£ Mareh 12, 1V35, to the effect that Mrs. Matha was
the owncr of en undivided half i1'ltere.st in tke claim. aaainst
tlte fJrcenfi,eT,.-z estate aml entered" jtuV.JrtI.cnt GWOr~1inD ker tke
ftill ... um of $12,ji.:i.ro wllick /tad been deposited in tke 8.
pcr·,l,r Court of the City anll County of ."''J,n Francisco in the
int.·r;,!ca.lcr &eti()n brought hy tllc ad:ubtistratol'll of the
Grcenfield t.lstatc. This jUflgment was e-utered 011 December
12, 1~3!.1. Mr. Matl.er appealed fro:1l this judgment up-'n the
grounJ that it was void becnus(' it was entered without not ice
und th~t the judge who he81'rl the lUntiur. and signed thp nl?w
judglllent had not presidfd at t.he' trinl (,vhieh was he!.' un
J:o'f'bruary 18, 1935, before Judge Frnnk M. Smith), find tkat
tke findings and iudgment determined issues wkick were not
before tke court, nam.el·y, tke right of Mrs. Matker to tke
$12,1;49.60 deposited witk tke Superior Court of tke Oity o.nd
County", San Francisco b" tke administrators of tke Greenfield estate in tlte interpleader action instituted by tkem.
Their argument in this rcspect was baRed upon the fact that
the administrators of the Greenfi!'Jd cstn1c wcre dismiGSed as
~parties to the Los Ang-eles action by stipulation of the parties
to Raill action on June 4, 1936, aud that thereafter there could
be nu is:;ue in the Los AUl!elt·s actiou rdative to the disposition
of the !;UID of $]~,549.60 on dep()~it in the Superior Court of
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the City ancl County of San I:<'rancisco, and that any issue in
rrgard to the disposition of this fund must be determined in
tbe action prnding in the last mentioned court. On pages
26 and 27 of appellant's opening brief in that case counsel for
Mr. Mather state: "Not only are there new and additional
findings, there are new and additional provisions in the judgment, not based upon any previous order for judgment or any
previous conclusions of law. These nl'W and auditional provisiOtls include in their operation the co-defclluants, e81ate of
Grecnfield. Edna Greenfield, administratrix, Herman W obbrl'
a!ld Hugo D. Keil, administrators thereof. This new portion
vf the judgment orders these co-defendants to pay the sum of
$12,:j/9.6(; to Dorothy Devore Mather co-defendant and respondent. (C1. Tr. p. 160, lines 14-19.) There was no such
provision in the l)revwus Judgment entered on March 14,
193/j, or in tlte conclusions of law filed on that date. (C1. Tr.
Pl'. 151, 154.) Oonsequently, the new judgment is void . . . .
"The pr:)Cllrement of this new provision in the judgment
is both an i1llposition on the co-defendants and apiJellants
aK'ainst whol:1 it is directed, and upon the judge. It orders thc
doing of an act which is impossible. The same money is now
in the hands of the Oourt in the San Francisco action. (See
supra, p. 4.) Furthermore, the procurement of this judgment
is in direct JisrC[Ja"d of respondents' later stipulation that
the same money be deposited with the Oourt in the San Francisco action, Itn·l tlischu1'gil1g the Estate of Greenfield and the
arlrninistrators thereof of liability to either A. W. Mather,
appellant herein, or to Dorothy lJevvre Mather, respondent
herein and in whose favor the new jucl[Jment is rendered.
'l'br estate 2.1t.1 the administrators were not only discharged
from liahility by stipulation of this same Dorothy Devorc
Mather, datl'.1 June 4, 1936, but pursuant to such stipulation,
all order uf Conrt was entered to thc sallie effect on June 5,
1!1:~(i, mono than three years before thc entry of the jud::ment
un Deccmbl'r 12, 1939. (See supra, i" 5. !'lCC also, stipulation
311<1 order thcre..n in Greenfield v. Mather, Ilt C1. Tr. p. 59,
lin.·s 12-20 thl:rcin.)" [Emphasis added.]
III their reply brit·f filed by c()\lll~d for Mr. Mather in the
llistrict Cnart (If Appeal, Secoud Appdlatt' Distrit't, on !<'cbruury 3, 1~J42, ill support of his n1';)(,:l1 frOl!! the judgmcht
of Dl'(·'·lI.b,or 12, 1~3~, in the Los Angdcs action, coullsel state
at pages 4~ ahd ·is: •• But eWll if we were so charitably Lotc1ined ns to permit reti]louoents to c~Il this new and different
mattt:r ill t.he third judgment 'surplusage', the rccvrd would

!
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Jl')t Ih'rJl:it it, b~callsc th~ ncw judgment, ill respect to til('
direction to pay the money to Mrs. Mather, is directly contrar~' to the recit.als ill the second juugUlent alld in the original
findiugs. 'I'he l>cc..nd judgment recites that: ' ... Messrs. Lorrill Andrey, sand Si clllC'Y Snyder appearil ~g as attorne:;s for
plaintiff and Messrs. Don Lake and James R. Jaffray for
dcfeudants Anna Inez M.atht'r and Lessie G. Williarns, the
other defendants not beillg represented in court, no relief
being demanded aga-inst said other defendants, who were made
I,arties f{Jr the purpose of aski11g for restraining delivery to
defendant Anna Inez ltlather of certl.in moneys and propertie.~ mentioned in the complaint, which restraint was effectuated by tlte issuance of a temporary injunction in said
action;' (Cl. Tr. p. 153, li:~es 16-25; Italics ours.)
"An i,lI-ntical recital wa."l JllElc Ie in th" findings of fact. (Cl.
Tr. p. 133, lines 16-25.) Consequently, the record shows affirmatively that all that was sought as to ERtate of GreenfielU was a
restraint Juring the pendency of the actioll, Ilnd that tbiR
rdief was accomplished hy a temporary injunction, wbich
'was dissolvetl February 27, 1935' (Cl. 'l'r. p. 151, linl' 20),
which diss ,Illtion was confirmed in the second juJgmeut. (C1.
Tr. p. 154, line 11.) On the face of the recurd, dU the relicf
that was sought agdnst the Greenfirld ]';siate was obtilinf'd,
and the Estate was in effect dismi.~sl'd frum tke case on Fellr'Uary 27, 1~35, whcn the restraint Wits dissolved, antI ftl.1I.~t
certainly so wlltn this di~solutiCln was cunfirmed in the Bceund
ju,.~gment." [Elllphasis aJded.]
There can be 110 question that it was the position of CUlmReI f{Jr Mr. Mather on the appeal from thl' judgment of Dl~cem
her 12, 1:J3~, in tht' Los An~eles actio!l which terminated in
the decision of Mather v. Mather, 22 Ca1.2d 713 [140 1'.2d
b08], that the all-important question as to wbo was nt-itle'!
to the sum of $12,549.60 on deposit ill t.h(' Superior C011rt flf
lh~ City and County of San Frallcbco in thc illt~rple~d('r
action, must be drtermined by n ju 1~lnent ill the iHkrpk:Jd"r
action. However, this cuurt reversed thl' j~ldf'lI1eJlt "f Dee~!(\
bel' 12, 1939, in the Los Anp.eIe!l nctinn on thc grut,ll!l t11~t
Mrs. Mather's counsel failed to [live sufficient !lOtic~ to ~nll lise) for Mr. Mather of their motion for entry of said ju.l~,'JllclJt
(Mather v.Mather, 22 Ca1.2d 713 [140 P.2d 808]). At l'n~c
718 flf its opinion in said case thiR eonrt st.ates: "Th.: jndgnH'llt,-beillg' based upon a finding that AUlla Inez Mather was
t IlP owner of one-half of th( c7aim Rgnim;t. the Grcenfielit cstlltr,
is erroneous ill adjudging' l!cl' to be thl' owner of the whole of

-
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8aid claim. Such condition of the rl,,'Cord precludes Rfiirmance
of the judgment as ~ proper terminntion of this liti~ntion."
[Emphasis added.]
It is obvious that the court was led into a misapprehensjon
as to the difference between a half interest in tho clfl :1:. nnd
half 01 the unpaid balance of the claim, as the opini'.>n statt·s:
"'I'he judgL'1ent being based u~ on a findinl7 th~t .Av'.1<:' I:.t·z
Mather was the owner of one-half of 'he claifll ~lgllilJst thl"
Greenfield estate, is erronE'OUS in Rdjudging her to be the
owner of the whole of said claim." [Emphasis add~d.] This
nrisconception is apparent when we refer to the finding l1Jade
by Judge Hanson on which the judgment of Dt?cclIlber 12,
1939, was based, which determines that Mrs. Mather is the
owner of an undivided one·half interest in fl8id claim. 'rItis
findiug is in accord with all of the pleadings and d'·ciE.ions iu
the <mse. The confusion arose in assuming that the $12,549.60
on deposit in the Superior Court of the City and County ~f
San Francisco which was awarded to Mrs. Mathl!r in sai~
judgment, constituted the whole claim, and was undllubt.cllly
due to the fact that no evidence was offered in the Los Angelt>s
nction relative to the payments received by Mr. aua MrR.
:Mather on their respective half interests in the claim which
would have disclosed that Mr. Mat.her had already rf'l'dVl',!
more than his share. Of course such evidence would nut klVt'
been relevant or material in the Los Angeles action hCI~'lllSt!
the amount which the respective parties werc entitlr.J to
receive as their respective shares of the claim was not all is,'me
in that case. It must necessarily follow that the ahovC-tluotetl
erroneous statelaent from the opinion of this court, 22 C~1.2d
713, is mere dictum because it was not within the issues in that
case and therefore could not have been determined either by
the trial court or this court.
After the decision of this court in Mather v. Mather, 22
Ca1.2d 713 [140 P.2d 808J, reversing the judgment (\f Dcel~Ul
ber 12, 1939, Mrs. Mather's attorneys went. into the Superior
Court of LOs Angeles County, and after obtaining an ortl,'r
expunging the judgments of Jnnuary 4th and March 14,1!J35,
they moved for a judgment on the merits based upon the findings made by Judge Frank M. Smith in support of tile jud~
ment entered by him on March 14, 1935. These motions werc
made before Judge Frank M. Smith, and on November 1,
194:3, be signed a judgment which determiJwd all of till.' issues
ill the Los Angeles action in favo!' of Mrs. Mather. This judg.
ment was ("utered on Noyember 1, 1943, and simply proyided

GKJ';f;N~'Il':Lll ·U. MA'fHER

31

132 C.2d 23; 194 P .2d 1l

)

)
/

that plailltiff A. W. l\latlwJ' tal,e lJothing by rcason "f his
complaint; that thl' temporary ilJjullctioll theretofore isslI('1i
restraining the administratol's of the Grcellfield estate r"(JIIl
llHlkiJ;g Ull.\· furtlll'J' IHlYIIlPnts to :\lrs. ~rall\('r on her halt'
intert'st in tlle claim against said est ate be dissolvecl; and that
Mrs. Mather recover her costs. No mention was made tbcreill
with respect 10 the disposition of the $12,549.60 on deposit
in the Superior Court of the City al1.~ County of San Frau·
cisco in the interph:ader action instltutNl by thl' admilli!'trntors
of the Grl'('llfiehl c::;tat,:. Mr. Mather appcal('d from this jud!,ment and it was rl'versl!d by tbis court in MuthtJr v. lIather, 2;:;
Ca1.2d 582 \154 P.2d 684J. It would appear that. this court
held in t.hat drcision that Mrs. Mather was entitled to only On!half of the $.12,519.60 on deposit ill the Superior Court of thc
City and County of San Fraucisco in the interpleader action
instituted by the administrators of the Greenfield est.ate as
distinguisbt'd from one-half of the whole claim against the
Greenfield estate which, as above shown, was the phraseology
used in tll<' decision in 22 Cal.2d 713. It is clear that the
opinion filed by this court at that time (25 Cal.2d 582) is
based upon the misC'onception that there was an issue in the
Los Angelees action relativc to the respectiYe interests of Mr.
and 1\1rs. Mather in this fund, as the only issne in that action
was whether or not the property settlement agreement, and
incidentally the assignment executed by Mr. Mather pursu'lnt to said agreement, was valid. This assignment dated June
16, 1933, transferred to Mrs. Mather an undh-ided one-half
interest in the unpaid balance of the approved claim of Mr.
Mather against the Greenfield estate. The last opinion of this
court. (25 Cal.2d 582) is. however, in conflict with its earlier
opinion (22 Ca1.2d 713), in that in the earlier opinion the
discussion concerned the respectivc interests of Mr. and Mrs.
Mather in the claim as· a whole, while in t.hc last opinion it
spoke of their respective right.s in thc fllmd of $12,549.60, which
was treat~d a;; b"ing synonymous with tLe wholt· claim. This
conflict rc:mltt'd because of the failure to distingnish the difference betwecn tIll' issues in the J.1os Allgl'll'S aUll Sun Francisco actions. In tlle complaint filed by Mr. Mat.her in the
Los Angeles actioll, be allcg"d that lit th,' time this assignment
wa:.; cxceutt'd there was due and unpaid on said claim the sum
of $38,6!)9 plus accrued interest, and that 1\Irs. Mather had
Deen paid on account. of her half interest in said claim th\l
sum of *7,4-11. He allcg'(',l that the u!'signment wai< invalirl
Ano t.hal Ill' was eJltitled to tilt' rrtllrtl of the sum which ;\I,'s.
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pain Imclrr it and that. she sllO\11<1 not TPamount hy virf.iH' of t.hr assignment. While
the nclminislrat.org of' fhe> Grcrllfit·l!l .·~;tat,· were joined I]!I
defendants in that fICtion, they were joined solely for the
pUrpOSe of restraining' them fr01l1 lila king any furtlJCr payJllent~ to Mrs. l\Iatlid. 'I'hey filcJ an answer in whieh they
!limply alleged that they Wllr,~ holding as the unp:\id Lalance
of r.'lid claim the sum of ~12,549.60 snbject. to the determination of the validity of the assignment whit'h Mr. Mather had
executed to Mrs. Mather for an undivided one-half interest
in said claim. No evidence was offered in any of the hearings
in the Los Angeles action as to what, if any, payments had
been made to Mr. Mather by the administrators of the Greenfield estate, and there was no showing before the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County at any time that Mr. Mathf'r
at the time he commenced the Los Angeles action had already
received more than his share of thf' proceeds of said claim
if his assignment to Mrs. Mather was yalid. These facts were
known to l\lr. Mather, as hehadsigne<1 vouchers for the payments which h(' had received from the administrators of the
Greenfield estate showing that he had received between the
date of the assignment on June 16, 1933, and the date of
the commencement of the action on August 4, 1934, a total
sum of $26,569.05, which was $3,439.23 more thlln his share
of the unpaid balance of the claim at the time the assignment
was executed. It is obvious that if the amount which the
respective parties were entitled to receive from the procf'eds
of this claim was in issue in the Los Angeles action, Mr.
Mather should have made a disclosure by either pleading or
proof in that action that he had received these payments and
that he was not entitled to receive any more of the proceeds
of said claim if the assignment executed by him to Mrs. Mather
was valid. But it is clear that the amount to which the respective parties were entitled from the proceeds of said claim was
not an issue in the Los Angeles aetion, and the ollly issuf' in
that. action with respect to said claim Waf; whether or )1ot the
a~signment to Mrs. l\father was valid. '1'hat issll(, WIIS first
determined by .Judge Frallk M. Smith in tht' finding'S aUll
judgment signed by him on l\Iarch 12, 19:1;,). a1111 again ill thp
judgment which he signed on November ], HI-13. Neitbf'r of
these judgments, nor the findings supporting the same, made
any referf'nce to the amount to which Mrs. Mat.her was entitled
from the proceeds of the claim. becaw;e there was 110 "ddf'lH'e
from which any determination of said allJount could be made.
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11 is abundant Iy cll'ar frOlIJ the r('I:or<1 that after the in·
terpleader action WII!I ~ommpnf'ed in San Fraucisco on Arril
12, 1!l35, Ilk 1\1 at hrr took thl' po~it ion that the hllme as to the
dispositioll of the SUIIl of $]2,M!l.liO deposited ill the Superio]"
Court of the City and County of SaIl Francisco by the administrators of the Greenfield estate in the interpleader action
commenced by them, was to he determined by the San Francisco court and not by the Los Angeles court. Mr. Mather
through his attorneys so contended in all of his briefs and
petitions nntil this court made the statement in its opinion
in 22 Cal.2d 713, that Mrs. Mather was entitled to one-half
and not the whole of said claim. This statement while correct
on its face was based upon a misconception that the whole
claim and the fund on deposit in the Superior Court of San
Francisco in the interpleader action was one of the same thing.
After the decision of this court in Mather v. Mather, 25
Ca1.2d 582 l154 P.2d 684], and on March 29, 1945, at the
request of Mr. Mather's attorneys, Judge Frank M. Smith of
the Superior Court of Los Angeles County entered a judgment
in the Los Angeles action awarding to Mr. Mather an undivided one-half of the fund on deposit in the superior court of
San Francisco aud the other half was awarded to Mrs. Mather.
No appeal was taken from this judgment and it became final.
This judgment was entered pursuant to the direction of this
conrt in its last-mentioned decision without amendment to
the pleadings .or the introduction of any evidence relative to
the payments received by Mr. and Mrs. Mather from the
administrators of the Greenfield estate on account of the claim
here involved. As before stated, no evidence was ever presented in the Los Angeles action relative to the respective
interests of Mr. and Mrs. Mather in the fund deposited in the
Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco by
the administrators of the Greenfield estate in settlement of
Mr .. Mather's claim against said estate.
It must be remembered that in the San Francisco action
Mr. Mather filed an answer and cross-complaint to the complaint in interpleader, iu which cross-complaint he joined
Mrs. Mather as a cross-defendant and alleged that the assignment executed by him to Mrs. Mather on June 16, 1933, of all
undivided one-half interest in his claim against the Greenfield estate was invalid and void because it was executed in
the 'l'erritory of Hawaii in violation of the laws of that territory, ano for that reason h(' waf; entitled to the full unpaiJ
U C.2d-a
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l/ahlllc'(' of Naic} ('!aim. Mrs. Mather also flIed an answer anl1
cross-complaint in said action in which !';he joined :Mr. Mather
as a cro!1s·oefcndant and alleged that she was the owncr of the
full amount deposited by the administrators of the Greenfield
estate in saidinterpleadcr action by virtue of the assignment
to her by Mr. Mather of an undivided one-half interest in
said claim. In said cross-complaint she asked the court to
determine the rights of the respective parties to said fund.
I t is conceded, and the record discloses, that no trial was
ever had on these issues in the San Francisco action as the
trial court considered the judgment of March 29, 1945, entered
in the Los Angeles action to be res judicata of all issues in
the San Franci};co action and refused to admit auy evidence!
as to the paymf'nts which had bcen made to either Mr. or
Mm. Mather by the administrators of the Greenfield 1.1It..'\te
SllhGeqUfmt t.o the date of said :)s~i:!nml'nt. This evidenc>e was,
hnwcver, offered by Mrs. Mather and now appears in the
record he fore us in the form of an offer of proof of the issues
in this action.
It is apparent from the foregoing that we have here a plea
of res judicata, bllsed upon a judgment rendered in an action
where, in the proct'edings therein, there were no pleadings or
evidence on the issue claimed to be adjudicated. While in
that act.ion tht' issue as to the respeetive intt'rests in the claim
against the Greenfield ('statt' (one-half t.o each) was consid"red, there was never involved, nor was any consideration
t"iven to the question as to what payments had been made on
the rCb'Pective interests in Raid claim by thf' administrators
of the Greenfield estate to either of the parties. The decisions
of t.his court in 22 Ca1.2d 713, and 25 Ca1.2d 582. which led
to the jud~ent claimed to be res judicata art' conflicting,
and this court was obviously misled and mistaken R.$ to the
true issues involved. Inconsistent positions have been taken
by both parties in these actions, and in view of the prior positions taken by Mr. Mather, he has little if any basis for reliance on the judgment in the Los Angele!1 action al> re!: judicata
of the issue in this action as to the amount to "hieh the respective parties are entitled from the fund on deposit in said
court. While tht! litigation was pendin~ in the TJos .Anp.cles action which led to the jndgn1l'nt h\!rll claim('d to be res judie.ata,
but which \lmbraced no issue as to the rights of the respL'Ctive
parties in th(' fund, the precise question had been prescnt.ed
in an action pending in the Superior Court of the City and
County of San Francisco and was clearly set forth in the
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pleadings on filr therein. From til!' offer of proof made by
Mrs. Mathrr in the t.rial court it apP('ars that Mr. Mather
hal' been paid more than hiR share of the claim against the
Greenfielrt estat.e, and although i\It-s. Mather bas made as:,:igll.
ments of ber interest in the claim, so far as appear::;, Mr.
]\Iather has not, thus indicating that no intervening innocent
1hird parties have been misled hy the Los Angeles judgment .
•\11 tho!:;e circumstances together with the faets and history
of tlle litlr.-ation heretofore set fort.h present a situat.ion where
th" rtoctrine of reR judicata should not be applied.
W" arc mindful of the rule thnt :l jlld1~mellt rendrT(,o in
lin nrtion in p,rsonam by a conrt havin1!' jl1risdictiC'n over
th, snbjcrt mattl-r and the partles is not void ano snbjc('t to
(,ollateral attack merely beeause it may erroneously determine
some matter not specifically raised in the pleadings, and not
rOYered by the cvidencp bpfore the trial conrt, and that such
1'1 judr-lllcnt iF. rps jndieata.
We adhE're to this rule. (See,
H/lpfer v. Brawner. 19 Ca1.2d 562 [122 P.2d 268] ; Estate of
/(eet, 15 CHl.2d 328 t100 P.2d 1045].) But in rare caseR a
judgment may not be res judieata, when proper consideration
is given to the policy underlying the doctrine, and there are
rare instances in which it is not applied. In such cases it
will not be applied so rigidly as to defeat the ends of justice
or important considerations of policy. (See, Guardianship of
Di Carlo, 3 Ca1.2d 225 [44 P.2d 562. 99 A.L.R. 990]; 50
C .• J.S .. Judgmellt.~, § 592.)
B~' l'r3S0n of the special circumstances appearing in this
case, as above narrated, we are constrained to hold that the
doctrine of res judicata should not be applied here, and
that t.he issue as to the respective portions of the fund on
(leposit in the court below to which the parties hereto are
entitled should be determined without regard to the judgment
in the Los AngeJes action. The judgment is reversed.

)

Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Schauer, J .• concurred.

/

)

'rHA YXOH, J .-1 dissent.
The majority opinion purports to adhere to "the rule that
a judgment in an action in personam by a court having juris·
dittion oyer the subject matter and the parties is not void and
Rllbject to collateral attack merel;v because it may erroneously
dcl('rminl' some matter not speeifical1y raised in the pleadings.
antlllot eu\'ered by t.he evidellre before the trial court, and that
Stil:h a judglllent is res judicata." It then departs from the
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rule by holding that the application of the doctrine of res
judicata in the present case would" defeat the ends of justice
or important considerations of policy"; how, auy more than
in hundreds of other cases where the courts have refused to
reexamine final judgments to determine whether or not they
were erroneous, is never specified. So cavalier a departure
from res judicata throws into question the finality of any
judgment and thus is bound to cause infinitely more injustice
in the long run than it can conceivably avert in this case. It
is an invitation to all unsuccessful litigants to relitigate their
cases, for they commonly view judgments against them as
erroneous and hereafter can contend with justifiable cause
that their eases also present an exceptional combination of
circumstances requiring a departure from the doctrine of res
judicata.
The Di Carlo ease, 3 Ca1.2d 225, 231) [44 P.2« 562, 99
A.L.R. 990], relied upon in thE' majority opinion, is not authority for the reexamination of a final judgment to detp.rmine
whether under the particular circumstances of the casc an injURtice has been done. In that CaRe, this court held in accord
with the weight of authority (see eases collected in 99 A.L.R.
996) that intermediate accounts of a guardian are not conclusive against a ward but may be reexamined by the probate
court upon a subsequent or final account. It noted that a differentrule applies to the intermediate accounts of executors,
administrators, and testamentary trustees, by virtue of Probate Code, sections 931 and 1123, and held such cases <listinguishable on the ground that an intermediate account of a
guardian is made while the adverse party, the ward, is under
a disability and usually unable to protect himself. (See also
99 A.L.R. 996 and the eases there collected.) "This distinction is sufficient to justify an exception to the normal application of res judicata." (Guardianship of Di Carlo, supra at
235.) The court did not find the circumstances of the Di
Carlo case so unusual as to justify an exception to the application of the doctrine but held merely that such proceedings are
not final as against a ward and therefore not within its normal
application. A rule that the doctrine of res judicata does not
apply to a specific type of order can hs.rdly serve as a basis for
a rule that the application of the doctrine depends on the
circull1stances of a ease, which must be rel'xaminpd to determine whether the doctrine will serve or "defeat the ends of
justice or important considerations of policY."

\
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By what test are the trial alld appellate courts of this state
to determine whether t.he circumstallces of a case are rare
enough to justify a departure from the doctrine of res judicata Y The dissPllt.ing opinions filetl by members of this court
demonstrate the difficulty of determining whether a partic:uJar
judgment defeats the ellds of justice or violates important
principles of policy, The numb~r of times this court has
,)wrruled earlier decisions is a reminder thnt principles of
justice and policy are not static. No test emerges from the
turbid generalities of the majority opinion; in fact it precludes any application of the doctrine of res judicata until
the courts look behind each judgment to the specific circumstan('es of each case to determine whet.her t.hose circumstances
involve such considerations of policy or justice as to require
a departure from the doctrine. The rule announced in the
majority opinion ther~fore defeats the whole purpose of the
doctrine of res judicata by casting the sharlow of doubt on the
finality of jurlgments.
The record in this case and the previous litigation between
the parties disclose only one ground for hoMing that the application of the doctrine of res judicata might result in
injustice, namely, that the opinion of this court in Mather v.
Mather,25 Cal.2d 582, 585 [154 P.2rl 684], directing the particular judgment may have been erroneous. Heretofore it had
virtually always been held that the correctness of a previous
order or judgment cannot be considered until it has heen
decided that the doctrine of res judicata is not applicable.
"An erroneous judgment is a.'!I conclusive 8S a ('orred one."
(Panos v. Great Western Pa.cking Co., 21 Cal.2rl 636, 640
[134 P.2d 242] ; Lamb v. Wahlenmaier, 144 Cal. 9]. 95 [77 P.
765, 103 Am.St.Rep. 66]; Edmonds v. Glenn Colusa 1rr.
Dist., 217 Cal. 436, 446 [19 P.2d 502].) Nor is it material that
the error, if any, may be an error made by this court or some
other appellate court. (Philbrook v. Newman, 148 Cal. 172,
174 [82 P. 772]; McPhee v. ReclamaUon District, 161 Cal.
566, 572 [119 P. 1077].)
Consider how often the circumstances of this case have been
reviewed. It is necessal'Y, however tedious, to recount the
circumstances once more to demonstrate that there are no consiJerations of policy or justice in thi~ case that warrant a
~departure from the doctrine of res jUf1i(·ata.
'rill' appeal in this rasp iR from a jUflgment in an Artion of
iuterpleacier to determine the rights of defendants to a cer-
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llJl(l~r n pl'u!)crty l!;1'tt1cllIlmt agreement execut<>d in
the Territory of Hawaii on June 16, 1933, betWQ£>ll A. W.
Mather, respondecUt, and Dorothy Devore Mather (also known
as Anna Inez Mather), one of the appdllllltS. Mr. Mather
assigned to Mrs. Mather a half interest in a claim and in the
interest thereon against the estate of Louis n. Greenfield.
'l'he agreement recited that the claim W/lS for $75,000. At the
time of the assignment, the principal due on the claim was
$38,699. During the litigation between Mr. and Mrs. Mather
regarding the validity of the property settlement agreement,
the adlllinil;tratol'l) of the Greenfield estate deposited with tllt,
clerk of the San }t'rallcisco Superior Court the sum of $12,549.60 on the claim of Mr. Mather. The pre::;cnt appeal was
take)) by Mrs. Mather aud her assignees from a judgment of
that court determining that 1\11'. Mather was entitled to half
the fund.
The rights of the parties to the fund in question turn on
previous litigation between them, including five appeals to
this court. On August 3, 1934, Mr. Mather brought an action
agllinst his former wife in the Superior Court of Los An~eles
County, hereinafter referred to as the Los Angeles action, to
rescind the property settlement agreement, joining as defendants Lessie G. Williams, the Security-First National Bank
of Los Angeles, and the administrators of the Greenfield estate. The complaint alleged that Lessie G. Williams, Mrs.
Mather's mother, claimed an interest in some of the property
involved in the litigation. She joined with Mrs. Mather in
demurrers and in an answer to the complaint. The complaint
also alleged that the Security-First National Bank of Los
Angeles was acting as Mrs. Mather's agent and had custody of
certain money and securities involved in the litigation. The
record fails to disclose any answer filed by this defendant.
The complaint also alle~ed that the administrators of the
Greenfield estate paid Mrs. Mather the sum of $7,441 on account of the assignment to bel' of a half interest in Mr. Mather's claim against the estate. Mr. Mather sougbt to have the
administrators restrained fr01l1 making further payments to
Mr:;. Mather under this assignlllent.
The administrators of the Greenfield estate answered Mr.
Muther's complaint alleging "That at all times hereinafter
mentioned these defendants . . . have held and now hold for
the account of whom it may concern. and on account of a claim
originally filed by A. W. Matlwr against the estate of Louis
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R. Greenfield, deceased, the sum of $12,549.60; that yarious
assigumclIts and noticcs of as...ignJilent 118\'c bc«'n served upon
these defendant.s affecting the said fund, anel among other
claimant!'! to f'llitl fund there are A. W. l\la1.her, Dorothy Devore Mat.her, Carl B. Rhodes and Don Lake, and thcse dcfendants aver that tlley are holding the said sum of $12,549.60
subject to the order and direct.ion of the above entitled court.
"WHEREFORE, these dcfendallts pray that t.hey may be hence
dismissed, that they may recover their costs of suit incurred
herein, and that they Jllay be released of all further liability
toward the parties in tbe above entitled action, and toward
all claimants in and to said fund so held by tbcsedefendants. "
Carl B. Rbode!> and Don Laltc, referred to in the answer of
the administrator!> of the Greenfield estate, are assignees of
lIrs. Mather and are parties to the present proceeding, although they were not parties to the Los Angeles action.
The complaint in the Los Angeles action recited three alleged causes of action against Mrs. Mather based respectively
on fraud, on misrepresentat.ion, and on the ground that the
agreement was ille£!"al undel' the laws of Hawaii. After three
amendments to the third count of the complaint, a demurrer
thereto was sustained without leave to amend, and on March
4, 1935, a judgment was entereel tbat plaintiff (Mr. Mather)
recover nothing on the alleged third ca use of action. 011 Feb·
ruary 7, 1935, Mr. Mather appealed from this judgment. (L. A.
No. 15233.) The cause then proceeded to trial on the issues
joined in the alleged first and second causes of action, and on
March 14, 1935. judgment was entered in favor of Mrs. Mather
on these ('anseR ofact.ion. The judl"llcnt provided that plaintiff recover nothing by rC8.!Ion of his complaint and di~solved a
temporary injunction restraining 'th(' administrators of the
Greenfield estat(' from maldng any more payments to Mrs.
Mather. Notice of appeal from this judgment was filed, but
on the motion of Mrs. Mather, the appeal was dismissed for
failure to file a transcript within the required time. (L. A.
15481; see Gree.nfieZd v. Mather, 14 Ca12d 228, 231 [93 P.2d
100].) Meanwhile, lir. Mather's appeal from the judgment
on the third cause of action was pending, and on March 17,
1936, this court dismissed that appeal on the ground that the
judgment was not final and tl\('refol'e not appealable. (Mather
v. Matlte.r, 5 Ca1.2d 617 155 P.2cI1174].)
While theRe appeals werE'penlting. the present action ",a.'S
eoJUllJl'Jl(,c~ll as an origiual at'fioll in int.crpleader by the ad-
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llIiuistl'atorl:l of the Urel'llfieJd e::;1.ate against A. W. MatIH·r,
the respondent hcrt·in, alld Mrs. l'tather, Carl B. Hhodt'salld
Don Lake as assignee::; of Mrs. 1.1athrr, the appellants herein.
The complaint filed by the administrators set forth the litigation to date and stated that both parties to the Los Angeles
action claimed the entire $12,549.60 and that the administrators were ready and willing to pay the money to whomever
might be entitled thereto. On August 15, 1935, the San Francisco Superior Court, on motion of the administrators and
pursuant to a stipulation of the defendants in this action,
directed the administrators to deposit this money with the
clerk of the court and discharge<l the administrators of all
claims and demands of the defendants. Mr. Mather and his
former wife and her assirrnees joined issue by cross-complaints
and answers. Mrs. Mather and her assignees claimed that her
right to the fund in question had been conclusively determined
by the judgments in the Los Angeles action. At the trial,
Mrs. Mather objected to the introduction of any evidence with
respect to Mr. Mather's ri~ht t.o the fund. The trial court.
sustained this objection and f'nt('r('d judtmlent for Mrs. Mather
on the ground that the jndgment.s in the Los Angeles a('tion
were final and binding on the parties. On appf'al, this court
reversed the judgment of the San Francisco Superior Court on
the ground that the Los Angeles judgments were not final.
(Greenfield v. Mather, 14 Ca1.2d 228 [93 P.2d 100].)
Thereupon on December 12, 1939 Mrs. Mathrr had a judgment nunc pro tunc entered in the Los Angeles achon purporting to cover the matters litigated in the earlier trial. This
judgment stated that in the findings of fact and conclnsions
of law filed on March 12, 1935, it is determinC'd that "plaintiff take nothing by reason of his complaint., anrl that snid
answering deft>ndants have their costs against. !laid plaintiff
and that the temporary injunction therc>tofore allowed
[against the administrators of the Greenfield EstatE'] was dissolved February 27, 1935, and should be dissolved ..
"It further appears by the answer of Estate of Louis R.
Oreenfield, deceased, Edna Greenfield, as Administratrix . . •
Herman WobbeI' and Hugo D. Keil, as Adllli:listrators of the
Estate of Louis R. Greenfield, deceased, that tJH'Y arf' holding
the sum of $12,549.60 on part of thf' ('Iaim of A. W. Mather
against said Estate which was t"ullsferrl'd awi Hssi~IH. . d hy hirn
to Anna Tnc>z Mather h~' the nalllt' of Dm'ofh,\' 1)('"orr Mnther,
••• expressly subject to the oruer aud dil'l~ctioll of the above
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('iJUrt in this adiolJ, alief ll1at said 1'11111 belongs to and should
be paid to said (lefendant Anna hwz Mather."
The judgment further provided as follows:
"(1) That plaintiff take nothing by reason of his eom
plaint. . . .
"(2) That the injunction heretofore issued in this action
be and the same is hereby dismissed and dissolved as of February 27, 1935.
"(3) That the answering defendants, Anna Inez Mather
and Lessie G. Williams have and recover their costs herein ....
"(4) 'fhat the Estate of Greenfield, Edna Greenfield as
Administratrix, and Herman Wobber and Hugo D. Keil, as
Administrators, thereof, do pay to said Anna Inez Mather ...
the SlUn of $12,549.60, admitted in t.heir hands subjt>ct to the
order and directions of this court in this action."
On ,January 4, 1940, Mr. Mather gave notice of motion to
set aside this judgment upon the ground that the motion for
pntry of judgment was made without notice to the adverse
parties and that the judgment was not in accord with the order
for entry of judgment or any order for judgment. Judge
Hanson, who gave the or(ler for the judgment of December 12,
1939, but who had not presided at the trial of the action,
denied this motion. In a memorandum opinion, however, he
made the following observations:
"An answer to the complaint was . . . filed by the administra.tors of the Estate of Louis R. Greenfield, they having been
joined as defendants with the defendants above mentioned,
wherein it was averred they held the sum of $12,549.60 for
such person or persons as might be entitled thereto, depending
upon the question as to who was the rightful assignee, if any.
of a claim filed by the plaintiff with the said administrators,
and that said administrators held said sum 'subject to the
order and direction of this court.' The case having gone to
trial on the issues made, the court filed its findings and condusions of law, in which it determined all the issues against
the plaintiff and found, among other things . . . that plaintiff
1ransferred 'one-half of the title standing in his name to the
ul)prowd claim again~t th(' ('statr of Louis R. Greenfield, deceased.' ...
"At the Dioment it seems t.o me that the judgment should,
at most, have recited tllat Anna Inez Mather was entitled to
one-half and not all of the $12,549.60 as it recites. I predicate
this thought on the fiuding above referred to. However, I
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hllVl' not luvl ()('/'Ilsion to Hcardl t.he fiI,' and it lIlay be that there
iH lin fIlllPll(lr,l fin,ling III' that tIll' rr('ilal in the judgment is
Rllstnined hy some other finuing. The file is large and I baye
no oC"asioll at this time to consider the point for reasons
presently to be stated.
"The motion of the plaintiff asks that the judgment I signed
be set aside (1) because it is not in accordance with my order
of December 7, 1939, granting the motion; (2) that timely
notiee was not given of the moHon. 'l'hese being the only
grounds stated, I call consider none other."
Mr. MatlH'r Appealed from the judgment of December 12,
1939 primarily on the grounds (1) tllat tht! motion for judgnlent was llludt' without notiee; (2) t.hat a judge who had
uot tried the case made new findin~s of fact in the recital in
the judgment and that the judgment did not conform to the
findings made after trial of the ease; (3) that the property
settJellwnt agr~ement was illegal unuer the laws of Hawaii.
'l'he Distric:t Court of Appeal filt'd an opinion on April 15,
JM2, to the effed that the judgment should be modified to
provide that Mrs. l\Iather was entitled to only half the sum
held by the administrators of the Greenfield estate, and as
modified should be affirmed. (JIlather v. Mather, (Cal.App.)
]24 P.2d 625. 628, 630.) Mrs. Mather petitioned for arehearing, l'lrs, Mather's petition was directed solely to the
question of the modification of the judgment. She contended
that certain allegations in Mr. Mather's complaint showed that
she was entitled to a judgment awarding her the entire sum
and that the new findings followed this complaint. Mr.
Mather likewise filed a petition for rehearing seeking a reYerslll of the judgmrnt and filed a separate brief in reply to
Mr", Mather'" Jwtition for a rehearing on the ground that
certain misstatenwnts were contained therein. Mr. Mather
contend eo that the issue as to the extent of the rights of the
respeetiYe parties in the fund in question was not determined
in the tria 1 and WIlS not covered in his complaint. Objections
were 11111(1(' to yarious alleged niisquotations from his complaint
811<1 fro~ll tlJ(> memorandum opinion of trudge Hanson. In this
bri('f. howewr, therr are "ewral statements that may be intrrprrt{'d as illdi,>ating that }\fl', 1\Tathpr WU" sllpporting the
po,;itioll taken by .Judgr llamMl Im!1 h~- thr District Court of
ApJwnl ,,-jtll respe(·t to the rig-hts of the parties in the fund in
queHt ion in th(' ('wnt thp judgnwnt "honkl br affirmed,
TIll' Dish'iet Court of Appeal granted a rehearing and on
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June 17, 1942, filed an opinion holding that the judgment was
void and that it was therefore not necessary to considt'r the
other questions raised by the parties. (Mather v. Mathe,.,
(Cal.App.) ]26 P.2d 960, 962.) Mrs. Mather then petitioned
this court for a hearing. Her petition was granted, and on
March I, 1943, an opinion was filed by this court modifying
the judgment to order the administrators to pay Mrs. Mather
"one half of the sum of $12,549.60, admittedly in their hands,
subject to the order and direetion of the court in this action
. . . " and affirming the judgment as so modified. (Mather v.
Mather, (Cal.) 134 P.2d 795, 800.)
This court stated in its opinion that the trial court had
found "that Anna Inez Mather had but a one-half inten'st
ill the claim against the Greenfield estate. That being so,
Anna Inez Mather should be entitled to only one-half of the
money in the hands of the administrators for payment of the
claim, in the absence of anything in the record to the contrary.
The record docs not show that the entire sum was being held
for her." (Matlle,. v. Mathe,., supra, 134 P.2d at p. 799; italics
added.) Mr. Mather filed a pptition for a rehearing, but Mrs.
Mather did 110t. Mrs. Mather opposed this petition, but thc
,'ourt granted it and filed a new opinion on August 27, H14a.
Tn the final opillion on that appeal this court r","l.'rsed the
judgment on the grounds that it was entllred without propl.'r
1I0tice to Mr. Mather and that it was incollsistent with the
findings and conclusions of law made at the trial of the :lction
in providing that Mrs. Mather was {'ntitled to the l'ntil'l!
8J2,549.60 in the hands of the administrators of the Glwnfidd
elitate. (Mather v. Mather, 22 Ca1.2d 713,717-7]9 [140 P,2rl
808] .)
Following this decision, the Los Augelt's Snp>lrior Conrt
ellter~~d a judgment substantially the s:unr I\S the fir~t purportl'd judgments iu the Los Ang-clt's artion in that it faih-d to
provide for the disposition of the money held by thr naministl'ntors of the Gref'ufil:'ld (·state. Mr. I\lathl'r npppakd to this
"')1lTt, conteuding that the "alinity of the property settlem.'nt
a!!rl'ement unde)' the Hawaiian In,,, had not vet b('en decided
hy this court nnd that till' jll(kllll'llt failed t~ follo\\' thl:' dt'ci!"ion in Mather Y. Mather, 22 Cl11.2d 7]3, .~npra, bp(~nns(' it did
llC)f dispose of th .. $12':)49.60. This court in Mather v. JIllther,
~'i ('aI.2d 582, fi87 11f)4 P.2d 6841, held thnt the property
~"1 tl"Il1l'nt ag-rct'lllf'nt was vali(\ hut tllnt tIll' jnd!.tllH'nt "joInted
tLl' directions of this' court on the former appcal. Accord-
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ingly, the judgment was reversed with directions to the trial
court to include "in its judgment a provision thnt the sum
now held on account of the claim against the Greenfield estate
be paid as follows: one-half to the plaintiff, A. W. Mather,
and onc-balf to the de,fcndant Anna Inez Mather."
The court noted that "While there appears in the record
Ii complicated mathematical argument whereby the defendant
Annn Inez Mather sl:\eks to show thnt she is entitled to the
whole amount of said claim, the point of division has already
been finally deeided. . . . " (Mather v. Mather, supra, 25 Cal.
2d at 585.) The argument referred to was substantially the
same one presented by Mrs. Mathtlr in her petition for rehearin~ in the District Court of Apptlal in the course of the third
appeal from the Los Angeles action. Although she contended
that Mr. Mather must haye received his full share of thE' claim
because of the Rmnll amount of money left in the hands of the
adJ:tinistrators of the Greenfield \.~f;t:lte, she made no refert'nce
to anything in the record that would indieate that any paym('nt had been made to Mr. Mather in excess of the amount
nd:nittedly paid to her.
Pursuant to the directions of this court, the Los Angeles
Superior Court, in March, 1945, entered a judgment determining "That the sum of $12,549.60 admittedly in the hands
of the estate of Louis R. Greenfield ... subject to the order
and direction of the court in this action, be paid as follows:
One-half of the said sum of $12,549.60 to plaintiff, A. W,
Mather, and one-half thereof to defendant, Anna Inez Mather.
. . ." No appeal was taken from this judgment and it has
become final. The question before this court in the present
p-roceedingis whether this is a valid judgment binding on the
parties to the present action.
On the present appeal, Mrs. Mather again claims the entire
amount of the fund, this time on the basis of un offer of proof
with respect to payments hf'retofore made on the claim against
the Greenfield estate. This offer of proof wa~ made for the
first time in the San Francisco action after tllf' March 1945
judgment of the Los Angeles court had become final, and Mr.
Mather had filed a supplemt"utal plt"ading in the San Francisco
interpleader action seeking half the fund on the basis of the
Los Angeles judgment. Mrs. Mather and her assignee claim
the right to show that the Los Angeles judgment is erroneous
with respect to the rights of the parties in the fund in question
on the following grounds: (1) The matter was not litigated

June 19481

/

GnEENFJELD'V. MATHER

45

r32 C.2d 23; 194 P.2d 11

in the Los Angeles Bl'lion; (2) th(' ns"igllf'~s flf J\lrs. J\llithpT
were not parties to the JJOs Angf'Jp.s Rf'fion; (3) thf' jllci/.!'nll'llt
in the Los Angeles a('tion, insofar as it purports to determine
the rights of Mr. and Mrs. Mather to the fund, was fraudulently obtained by Mr. Mather's concealing from the trial
court and this court that he had been fully paid his half interest on the claim. In support of these contentions, Mrs.
Mather offered to prove that Mr. Mather signed vouchers of
the Greenfield estate acknowledging payments equal to at
least half of his approved claim of $38,699 and the accrued interest thereon between the dates of the property settlement
agreement and the filing of his complaint in the Los Angeles
action in August 1934. According to this offer of proof, Mrs.
Mather received only $7,441, and the remainder of her half
of the approyed claim and interest was withheld by the administrators of the estate and amounted to the entire $12,549.60. The offer of proof was rejected by tlle trial court and
judgment was entered in accord with tlle final judgment in the
Los Angeles action.
At the time of the appeal in Greenfield v. Mather, 14 Cal.2d
228, supra, the Los Angeles action had not been terminated
by a final judgment, and the rights of the parties were therefore not finally determined. Since that time a final judgment
has been entered in that action, which was pleaded by Mr.
Mather in his supplemental cross-complaint. The jUdgment
in the Los Angeles action is therefore conclusive in the present
action insofar as it meets the requirements of res adjudicata
or estoppel. (Bennett v. Forrest, 24 Cal.2d 485, 493 [150 P.2d
416]; Williams v. Southern Pac. 00., 54 Cal.App. 571, 576
[202 P. 356] ; Rest., .Judgments, § 43; 2 Freeman on Judgments (5th ed.), 1925, 1519.)
It is contended that the present action does not involve the
snme cnuse of action as that involved in the Los Angeles aetion
on thE' /!ronno that final determination of that action did not
nef'('ssitatE' a determination of the respective rights of the
parties in the fund. Even if it be assumed that the two easps
do not involve the same cause of action, the Los Angelf's
judgment, as a final judgment, is effective by way of estoppp}
and is binding on the parties thereto and their privies with
..: respect to the matters aetnally litigated. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1908; Sutphin v. Speik, 15 Ca1.2d ]95, 202. 205 [99 P.2d
652.101 P.20 4~7] ; see PailOs v. Great Western Packing Co.,
2] Cal.2d 636, 637~638 [134 P.2d 242] and cases there col-
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lee ted ; Rest., Judgments, § 68; 2 Freeman, op. eit. supra,
§ 676.) Whether or not consideration was given at the original trial in Los Angeles, to what was the extent of the rights
of Mr. Mather and Mrs. Mather in the fund in question that
question has been the main one in the litigation between the
parties in the last two appeals to this court. This court has
expressly beld that the question was put in issue by the answer
of the administrators of the Greenfield estate, and a final judgment in the Los Angeles action has been enterM expressly
dividing between Mr. Mather and Mrs. Mather the sum of
$12,549.60 held by the administrators of the Greenfield estate
subject to the orders of the Los Angeles court.
It follows that unless the final Los Angeles judgment is void
and subject to collateral attack, Mrs. Matber is bound by the
determination of the Los Angeles court that she is entitled
to only half the sum of $12,549.60 that was still due on the
claim against tht' Greenfield estate at the time the administrators filed their answer in the Los Angeles action. Mrs. Mather
contends, howt'ver, that the question of the respectivt' rights
of the parties in this fund was not in issue in the Los Angeles
nction, on the ground that the answer of the' Greenfield estate
was 110t served on her and that there was no evidence presented
at the trbl of that action with respect to tbc extent of their
ril,ht3, the soh' issue at the trial having been thl! validity of the
ag'l'ccment b,·twt'en Mr. and Mrs. Mather under which the Intt.l'r claims an interest in the fund. It was Mrs. Mather, how~vcr, who harl t1I\' jud{!,mcnt of December 12, 1939, enterIJd in
the I.1os Angeles action that expressly determined that the
matter was put in issue by the answer of the administrators.
Moreover, before that judgment was entered she bad a judgment entered in San Francisco determining that she was entitled to the whole sum on the ground that her right thereto
WM finally determined by the first judgments in the Los Anl!e1es nction. (Greenfield v. Mather, 14 Ca1.2d 228 [93 P.2d
]00].) .\fter this litigation nnd after the question was determined in the Los Angeles action and argued before this court
on several nppeals, a final judgment was entered pursuant to
the express directions of this court, determining that the matter was in issue in the Los Angeles action and that Mrs. Mather
was entitled to only balf the fund in question. Regardless of
whether the Los Angeles judgment and the opinions on which
it is based are erroneous, they are not void and not subject to
collateral attack.
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Although there is language iu cases sneh as Baar v. Smith,
201 Cal. 87, 98 {255 P. 8271, to the effect thnt a judgment that
deterwines a matter not. specifically put in issue by the pleadings or covcred in the evidence at the trial is not only I!rroneous
but void and subject to collnteral attack, such cases have becn
diRtinguished on the ground that in those eases "the question
of 'validity' of the judgment was being considered in connection with an appeal from the judgment. . • . None ofthcs",
cases would justify a conclusion that the prior judgment must
be dcc1nrtld void. ff (Kupfer v. Brawner, 19 Ca1.2d 562, 564565 [122 P.2d 268], eiting cases containing such dicta.) A
judgUltlDt is· subject to collateral attack only whtln the court
lncks jurisdiction "over the cause, oyer the pnrties, and ovor
the thiug, ",h\-n a specific thing is the subj"ct of the judgmcut. " (Code Civ. Proc., § 1917.) Since the judgment in the
present case was in personam, no problem of the jurisdiction
OVtlr a specific thing or in rem is involved in this case. An in
personam jud~ent by n court that has jurisdiction OVtlr thl~
8ubj('ct matter lind over the parties is therefore not void and
subjert to (~llnt-t!rn.J attacl, merely becau.<re it D13y erroncously
dcterminl.' soml' matter not Hpcdfically raised in th(' pleadings
nnd not covered in th~ evidence before the trial court. (Ex
parte Bennett. :14 Cal. 84, 87; Kupfer v. Bra.wn6r, 19 Ca1.2d
562, 564 [122 P.2d 268] ; Estate of Keet, 15 Cal.2d 328, 333335 [100 P.2d ]045].)
Even if it is assumed therefore that this court erroneously
determined that the :mswer of the administrators of the Greenfidd estatc pnt in issue the rights of the parties, that determination and the judgment based thereon is not void... {t] he
scope of a judgment., when collaterally attacked, is not liruited
to the factual or legal points expressly urged by counselor
considered by the court; it extends to matters which could
haye been raised and considered in the particular proceedings
undpr the particular pleadings." (Estate of Ked, supra, 15
Ca1.2d at p. :-l34.) The principal issue raised by the pleadin{!s
of Mr. ftnd 1\frll. :Mather was th(1 "alidity of the property sl.'ttlemE'ut agrE'em('nt, including the provision for an equal division
of the claim held by Mr. Mather against the administrators of
the Greenfield estate. The complaint of Mr. Mather put in
- issue the right of Mr~. Mather to any interest in the claim. It
cannot seriously be argued therefore that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to determine the rights of Mrs. Mather in t.he
amount still due on the ('lnim at the time of trial, whether or
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not such jurisdiction may have berll erroneously exercised~
The sum held by the administrators subject to the orders 0
the court was the amount still due on the claim and the tria
('ourt on directions from this court determined the interes
I)f the parties in that sum.
Nothing could be gained by attempting to d@tcrmine,
whether the error, if any, in the opinions of this court and ini\
the judgment was attributable to Mrs. Mather, who obtainc.d l
judgments in San Francisco and Los Angeles based on the
theory that this issue was actually tried in Los Angeles and
who contended before this court that the matter was in issue
in Los Angeles, or was attributable to certain statements in a
brief filed by Mr. Mather on one of the former appeals. Nor
can Mrs. Mather claim that she was deprived of a hearing .
on this question, for the issue as to the rights of the parties
in the fund was determined in the Los Angeles judgment,
l:Lnd the correctness of the determination has been argued at
length in the former appeals and con!>idered· in the opinions
of this court and of the District Court of Appl'l\l. Whatt'ver
thC' cause of error, if there be any, thc final judgment of the
Los Anlrt'lf,S Superior Court conclusively detl'rmincs the rights
of Mr. and Mrs. Mather in the sum of $12,5-19.60 held by the
administrators of the Greenfield estak
The anl:lwer of the administrators referred to the fnet that
the administrators had received notice of assignments of part
of t.he daim to Carl Rhodes ano Don IJake. Both Rhodes /lno
IJake are a.'lSip.'I1ees of Mrs. Mat.her /lno wprc joined a.c:; opfendantA in the San Francisco interpleader action. It is contended
by Mrs. Mather and her aR."Ii:mees that the Los Angeles jud~
ment is not cone.!usive on thp ri~hts of the parties to the
present action, on the ground that t.he assIgnees were not parties to the Los Angeles judgment. A final judgment, however,
operates 8S res judicata and by way of estoppel, binding not
only the actual parties to the judgment blit thosp person~
who are in privity with t.hem. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1908; Bernhard v. Bank of A'merica, 19 Ca1.2d R07, 811 [122 P.20 R921 ;
Rest. Judr,ment.s, § 83; 1 Freeman, op. cit. suprn, 959.) The
plpadinr,s of 1\fn;. Mather and her assi~nees r,~flltp thl' assignees' claim that they are not bouud by the Los Angeles judgment to thp same extent as :Mrs. Mathr>r in!;ofar as it W:iS CODcerned with t.he fund. It is admitted ill thOSe! pl~adluJ!" that
the assignnll:'nt~ were made 011 A lll!llst 4, 19~4. TIle LoIS AngelI'S action was commenced on August 3, 1934, Hnd it is not
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contended that t11(' aRsi~llees, Ol1e of whom has been nn attorn('y for M,·s. Mather throughollt this litigation, did not bavo
notice of f I\(' commf'nc(,llIent of th(' action. l\loreo\'cr, they
joined in Mrs. Mather's plE'aoillgs in which she set up the
original pllrpOl,t!'d judgmE'nfs in that a(,tion as a bnsis for
recoverr on the former trial of thl' present action. The Restatement of Judgment.s, section 89, provideR that, "A person
who, ufter the beginning of an action succE'eds to the interest
of one of the parties is entit.led to the benefits of the rules of
res judicata with reference to the subject matter; and he is
bound br such rules.... " (See also 1 Freeman, op. cit. S11.pra,
967.) This rule applies in California at least when such perSOllS "have notice, actual or constructive, of the pendency of
the aetion or proceeding." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1908(2).)
It is also contended that the judgment in the Los Angeles
action is not binding on tht! parties to the present action,
because certain persons were parties to that action ,,,ho arc
not parties to the present action. The parties referred to
claimed an interest in some of the property involYed in the
property settlement agreement but did not. claim any interest
in the fund in question. Since the title t.o the fund could be
determined withont the presence of thOflf' part.ies, th('ir presence in that action is not matE'rial wit.h rp.,qper.t t.o thp etrpet
of tbE' jndgment. in the Los Anr,el!'s :\ction 011 the tit1!' to the
fund. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1910.)
The tI~iglle~ of Mr!:l. Mather eJaim also that the judgment
ill the presL-nt action ~hould be l'cycr.,;cd on the grounu that
it fails to d~tf'!l'min(> the rE'spective rights of Mrs. :Mather and
her assigul!E's in ber bh:lrE' of tht' fnnd. 'rhMe parties, however, requestt'd no snch detE'rmination by tIlE' trial court, but
in their pleadings alleged that thert' was no dispute am.ong
thE'lD and no CRuse for st'ttlement by the court.
It is contended finally, tl1at the March, 1945 judgment in
tht' Los Angeles action insofar as it relatt's to the fund was
procured by fraud on the part of Mr. Mather and his attorneys. The al1egations of frand are twofold: (1) Tbat at the
trial of the Los Angeles action Mr. Mather conspired with his
attol'nE'Ys t.o cOllceal payments made to .him hy tbe administrators of the GreE'nfield estate; (2) that Mr. Mather's briefs
on prt'vions appeals contain fraudulent misrepresentations of
fael with rE'spect to paympnts made 011 t.he claim by the admill j~tl'lItOl'S.
'111{- trial court fOllnd tlln1 thE'se allt-gntiolls are untrll1".
~ol'mal1y the qUE'sf-ion wbether a judgment was procured by
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fraud may not be. considered on a collateral attack on the
judgment but must be determined in an independent action
in equity to set aside the judgment for extrinsic fraud. (Estate
of McNet'l, 155 Cal. 333, 345 [100 P. 10S6} ; additional cases
collected in 15 Cul.Jur. 63.) The finding of the trial court,
llowcver, indicates that. the court regarded llrs. Mather'.
nn:'Wer to the supplemental cross-complaint of Mr. Matheraa
an equitable defeuseto the judgment in the nature of an
action in equity for relief therefrom. (See Rest., Judgments,
§ 112(0).) For tile purposes of the appeal it may be assumed
that the answer of Mrs. Mather properly put in issue her
right to equitable l'elief from the judgment for extrinsic fraud.
There is no evidence in the record, however, from which we
can determiue the corrt'ctness of the trial court's 1inding with
respect to the anegation that Mr. Mather was guilty of fraudul~ut couceahucnt at t.he time of the trial in the Los Angeles
action. In any evcnt, it wns unnecessary for the trial court to
make the undinJ!, for Mrs. Mather failed to show any basis
for equitable relief froJU thejlldgment.
If Mr. Mather did concenl nny payments made to him before the COJllJUcucem('nt ·of the Los Angeles action, there is
no allegation or offer of proof sufficient to show that he fraudulently kcpt :Mrs. Mather fronlsour~ of evidence that would
have revealed this fact. There is nothing in Mrs. Mather's
allegations or otfers of proof to indicate that due diligence
on h('r part would not have revealed evidence of such overpnyment. Thl' administrators of the Greenfield estate, who
alle!!edly mndl' these payments, were parties to the Los Angeles
action and were plU'ties to the present action until dismissed
on the stipulation of the defendants. There is nothing in the
record to indicate that they were not available at those times
to testify as to any payments made on the claim. Even if Mrs.
Mather may have believed such testimony unnecessary at
those times, she cannot now invoke that belief to prevent the
application of the doctrines of res judicata and estoppel by
judgment. (Er1lsti1lg v. United States, Inc., 206 Cal, 733, 737
r276 P. 103].) Nor can the application of those doctrines
be avoided by the claim of newly discovered evidence. (Quirk
v. Roonev, 130 Cal. 505, 511 [62 P. 825] ; cases collected, 149
A.L.R. 1195, 1198, 1201.)
It i'l also alleged that Mr. Mather and his attorneys made
stntemcnts in his bricfs on appeals from the various Los AngclE.'s judgments that cll'arly implied that as a matter of fact
he wa,s not paid more than his former wife was paid on this

